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"COMING OUT": THE PRACTICAL
BATTLES OF BEING VISIBLE AS
A LESBIAN
BARBARA J. Cox*
When I decided to speak at the Symposium on the topic of practi-
cal battles, I was unsure what I could cover that might be interesting
to you. As the days passed, I discovered that the theme of "coming
out" and being visible as a lesbian is at the root of all the practical
battles I fight. Those practical battles have two aspects: ones that are
personal and ones that are professional. First are the personal exper-
iences I have almost daily which require me to "fight" some battles
based on openly expressing my lesbianism; second are the legal battles
that I choose or am asked to fight. It seems that having the courage to
express our sexual orientation in our personal lives informs our strug-
gles when we pursue legal battles. Just as we demand space to live in
the world when we openly express our lesbianism to the people we
encounter, so too do we demand a space in the legal system and ask
for those rights and benefits granted to non-lesbians but denied to us,
or ask for the elimination of harms inflicted simply because we are
lesbian.
When writing this essay, I found that each personal experience I
wanted to discuss had a corresponding legal battle. That dynamic
serves as the outline of this essay.
I. BATTLES ENCOUNTERED AS PART OF A
LESBIAN COUPLE
Every year, California Western School of Law ("CWSL"), where
I am a law professor, has a formal dinner/dance to which faculty, staff
and students are invited. I have been at CWSL for eight years now,
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. J.D. 1982, University of Wiscon-
sin Law School; B.A. 1978, Michigan State University.
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but have never attended the dance. Part of the reason for my reserva-
tion is my fear of formal gowns, which I am sure is based on my exper-
iences buying clothes as a woman who is six feet tall.1 But even more
overpowering has been my hesitation to dance with my female part-
ner, at a formal dance, especially in front of the majority of the stu-
dent body.
I cannot quite figure out my hesitation. I am out at school; I fre-
quently talk in my classes about being a lesbian or about lesbian or
gay issues that arise in class; my biography in the school bulletin states
that I am past chair of the AALS section on gay and lesbian issues;
and the comics and buttons outside my door would clearly inform any-
one that I am gay. So where does this internalized homophobia about
dancing in a heterosexual environment with my lesbian partner come
from?
By dancing with my partner, I will be "seen" as a lesbian and will
be "acting" as a lesbian. When I talk in class, even telling stories
about my encounters, I can maintain a certain distance between
myself and my students because we are "talking." But dancing at a
formal dance in formal attire feels much more "exposed."'
Perhaps my problem is similar to the one that plagues the FOX
network with its character, "Matt," on Melrose Place. Matt is out on
the show as a gay man and has had story lines including getting fired
from his job working with children because he is gay, being gay-
bashed and helping a Naval officer come out to his family and deal
with the fallout when he is discharged. However, Matt still has not
had a sexual relationship. In a show where every other character is
constantly dealing with sexual relationships, Matt's lack of one is all
the more startling. Somehow, I too must find it easier to "be" out and
to "talk" about being a lesbian than to express my affection and sexu-
ality physically by dancing with my partner in front of a primarily
1. Cf Maureen J. Arrigo-Ward, No Trifling Matter: How the Legal System Supports Perse-
cution of the Obese, 10 WIs. WOMEN'S LJ. 27 (1995) (examining the bias faced by "large"
women).
2. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Confla-
tion of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law & Society, 83 CAL L
REv. 1 (1995). One of the gay men at work indicated that he was attending the ball this year in
"drag," wearing a long slinky black ballgown. He wondered if he would draw some negative
reactions. I told him I hoped not, but that I expected he might. I told him that I too was
attending in "drag," wearing a tuxedo, but that I believed this reversal in sex-appropriate attire
would not be nearly as threatening or provocative as his choice of wearing a slinky black dress.
3. Gregory Flood, Letters to the Editor, THE ADvoCATE, Feb. 7, 1995, at 6 (responding to
Chris Bull, Acting Gay, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 27, 1994, at 44).
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straight audience. My partner and I have had numerous discussions
about going to this dance and each one leaves us committed to going
and yet uneasy at the prospect. But why should it be so difficult to
dance?
The same week that I was pondering whether to go to the dance
and eliciting commitments from my gay or lesbian colleagues to
attend with their partners, my partner was notified that she would be
laid off from her job in two weeks. For those of us working and living
in Southern California over the past few years, this announcement is
not particularly novel. But the fear and dismay we felt was not less-
ened by its familiarity.
We had to face and determine what was going to happen to us,
and our ability to pay our bills, once my partner was not working. We
also had to address the question of how to maintain her health insur-
ance coverage once she was unemployed. This issue of insurance and
its seemingly inevitable attachment to employment was one of the
major concerns in the national debate on health care and insurance
reform.4
Thankfully, we are among the lucky few who are eligible to
receive domestic partner insurance benefits. Most employers assess
whether the beneficiary is the "spouse" or "dependent" of the
employee as the basis for eligibility to receive insurance and other
benefits such as sick leave to care for an ill partner, bereavement leave
to mourn the death of one's partner or a member of one's partner's
family, membership in health clubs and access to married person's
housing or housing allowances. 5
Due to my work in prior years on domestic partner issues,6 when
I arrived at CWSL I began urging the administration to adopt a
4. Anthony C. Beilenson, How Congress Should Operate on Health Care System, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at B17; David R. Olmos, Health Care Industry Anticipates Friendly Cli-
mate, Modest Reform, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at D1.
5. Steven Briggs, Domestic Partners and Family Benefits: An Emerging Trend, 1994 LAB.
L.J. 749, 749-50.
6. See Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits
Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIs. WoMm's LJ. 1 (1986) [herein-
after Cox, Alternative Families]; Barbara J. Cox, Choosing One's Family: Can the Legal System
Address the Breadth of Women's Choice of Intimate Relationship?, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.
299 (1989) [hereinafter Cox, Choosing One's Family] (based on my experiences as Chair of the
Alternative Families Taskforce and President of the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission
during the partially successful attempt to pass an alternative families ordinance in Madison,
Wisconsin).
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domestic partners' benefit policy that would provide insurance bene-
fits to same-sex partners of employees. With the help of my col-
leagues,7 the school adopted a policy which provides domestic partner
health and dental insurance to the same-sex partners of employees.8
While it took quite some time and delicate negotiations, both with the
school's administration and then between its benefits officers and our
health and dental carriers, CWSL now provides benefits to same-sex
couples which opposite-sex married couples assume are theirs as enti-
tlements or rights.9
Because of CWSL's progressive policy and because of the efforts
of its gay and lesbian faculty to obtain these benefits, my partner and I
did not have the additional concern about insurance coverage once
her job ended. Although COBRA rights do exist,10 continuing that
insurance would cost us significantly more than adding her to my
policy."
These two experiences remind me of the battles I continue to
wage as a member of an out, lesbian couple. While we may feel
uncomfortable attending the dance in our matching tuxedos, we have
chosen to attend as another step in the "coming out" process and to
support others in the law school community who are also willing to
challenge the notion that formal dances are reserved for opposite-sex
couples. And we know that should we have an accident on the way to
the ball, both of us will be covered by insurance provided by my
employer.
7. Particularly involved were Professors Scott Ehrlich and Frank Valdes, with support
from Chief Financial Officer Lenore Fraga.
8. The school opted to provide coverage only to same-sex domestic partners because it
reasoned that opposite-sex couples had the option to marry, which is denied to all same-sex
couples. Briggs, supra note 5, at 750 n.3. It is now rethinking its policy at the behest of unmar-
ried opposite-sex couples who believe they are equally entitled to these employer-provided ben-
efits. In our debates in Madison, the task force took the position that the alternative family
definition should not be limited to same-sex couples, but should extend to all couples who met
the definition of "two adults... plus dependents." Cox, Choosing One's Family, supra note 6, at
304 n.12. A majority of academic institutions offering domestic partner benefits limit those ben-
efits to same-sex couples although some do offer benefits to opposite-sex couples as well. See M.
V. Lee Badgett, Equal Pay for Equal Families, ACADEME, May-June 1994, at 26; Benefit Availa-
bility Growing But Not Universal, CUPA NEws, May 15, 1995, at 1.
9. Cox, Alternative Families, supra note 6, at 2.
10. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 26 U.S.C. § 4980B(f) (1995).
11. For example, paying for my partner's insurance using her continuing COBRA rights
would cost us $197 per month; adding her to my employer-based health insurance will cost us
$60 per month, for a savings of $1644 a year.
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II. BUT CAN MY PARTNER BE MY WIFE?
Although many employers and municipalities are beginning to
recognize alternative families and domestic partners, same-sex
couples still cannot legally marry in any state in the United States. In
fact, only three countries - Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands
- recognize anything resembling marriage; they permit "registered
partnerships" of same-sex couples with many, but not all, of the bene-
fits afforded opposite-sex married couples. 12
Despite the fact that same-sex couples cannot marry, many les-
bian or gay couples choose to have public or private ceremonies cele-
brating their lifetime, commitment to one another.' 3 My partner and I
had a commitment ceremony in April 1992 to celebrate our decision
to live together in a long-term relationship.' 4 After our ceremony, we
have on occasion referred to each other as our "spouse." In fact, our
wedding invitations included a line from a lesbian singing group:
"We're going to have a happy life, both of us are going to be the
wife."'15
In early February, I was at the store looking at Valentine's Day
cards for my partner.' 6 After looking through all the generic cards -
the ones with bears and other androgynous critters on them - I
12. Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriages and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are
We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033, 1034 n.9. For example, in
Denmark, same-sex couples cannot adopt or share custody of children, one member of the
couple must be a citizen of the country and they cannot have the partnership recognized outside
the country. See Shaugn Morgan, Legal Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Relationships, 3 Aus.
TA- AsIA GAY & LESBIAN LJ. 57, 64-65 (1993). It is the author's understanding that Den-
mark, Sweden and the Netherlands have begun negotiations to consider recognizing each other's
"partnerships" by same-sex couples.
13. See generally, LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE PRIVATE COMMrrMENTs, PUBLIC CERE-
MONIES (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992) (examining the state of same-sex marriages); Tess Ayers &
Paul Brown, Tim ESSENTIAL GuIDE TO LESBIAN AND GAY WEDDINGS (1994) (etiquette and
wedding planning guide).
14. For a discussion of the author's reasons for having a commitment ceremony, see Bar-
bara J. Cox, A (Personal) Essay on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 NAT'L J. SEX. OREN. L. 87 (1994)
(available via internet at http://sunsite.unc.edulgaylaw).
15. Two NICE Gnus, Let's Go Bonding, on CMOE LrcEs OLviA (Rough Trade).
16. During my Women and the Law course, I teach a section on understanding privilege.
We discuss male privilege, white privilege, class privilege and heterosexual privilege. Using
questions developed by Peggy McIntosh, Associate Director of the Wellesley College Center for
Research on Women, from her presentation, "Understanding Correspondences Between White
Privilege and Male Privilege Through Women's Studies Work," I discuss with my students some
of the types of heterosexual privilege that are denied to me as a lesbian. One of those is that I
cannot "easily buy posters, post-cards [sic], picture books, greeting cards, dolls, toys and chil-
dren's magazines featuring people" of my sexual orientation. PEGGY McINTosH, WHrTE PRm-
LEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRLESPONDENCES
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turned to the section of cards for "my wife." I spent several minutes
looking through the numerous cards in that section, trying to find one
that did not refer to the giver of the card as a male or a husband.
During that time, I was conscious of each new man who came to the
card section and started looking for a card for his valentine. I felt
conspicuously out, even blatantly so, as a woman looking for a valen-
tine card for "my wife." Although I feel comfortable being out in
virtually all circumstances, I was once again struck with the discomfort
of being out to anonymous strangers. I was afraid that any one of
them might make an unpleasant comment or start to harass me. I
kept shifting from section to section trying to decrease the chance that
someone might realize that I am a lesbian. I ended up buying a card
with an androgynous bear on it, partially because I could not stand
looking in the wife section any longer and partially because it was
better suited to the sentiment that I wished to express than the cards I
found in the wife section. Apparently unlike many of my male coun-
terparts, I do not leave my socks all over the floor and have not for-
gotten to tell my partner how important she is to me at times other
than Valentine's Day.
This experience coincides with the work that I have done over the
past eighteen months regarding marriages of same-sex couples. As
many of you know, the Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case of
Baehr v. Lewin17 to the trial court to determine whether Hawaii's
marriage statutes violate its constitutional prohibition against discrim-
ination based on sex. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the mar-
riage statutes were presumptively unconstitutional unless the State
could establish that the statute was justified by a compelling state
interest and was narrowly drawn so as to avoid unnecessary abridge-
ment of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.' 8
The question I have been researching is whether same-sex
couples who marry in Hawaii will be afforded similar recognition in
their own domiciles. 19 Answering this question requires analyzing the
issue under two separate doctrines.
One analysis considers whether other states must recognize a
same-sex couple's marriage under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN'S STUDIES, (Wellesley College Center for Research on Women,
Working Paper no. 189, 1988) (emphasis added).
17. 852 P.2d 44, 66 (Haw. 1993).
18. 852 P.2d at 68. The plaintiffs were two lesbian couples and one gay male couple. Id. at
48.
19. See Cox, supra note 12.
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the United States Constitution.2" Establishing that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires all states to recognize a valid marriage per-
formed in another state would not only resolve this question, but
would also provide the most immunity from legislative tampering.21
Such marriages could qualify for recognition under each prong of the
clause,22 and would be consistent with prior Supreme Court prece-
dent.2 However, the Supreme Court has never decided whether mar-
riages must be accorded respect under the Full Faith and Credit
20. U.S. CONSr. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."). On a personal note, I am grateful for the assistance and
research of Evan Wolfson, Senior Staff Attorney at Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
for my understanding of the full faith and credit issue. See Deborah Henson, Will Same-Sex
Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on
States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following
Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 J. FAm. L. 551 (1993-94) (examining the legal status of same-sex
marriages).
21. The type of legislative tampering that is dangerous to the rights of same-sex couples to
marry can be seen from a bill recently passed by the South Dakota Assembly which reads: "Be
it enacted by the legislature of the state of South Dakota... any marriage between persons of
the same gender is null and void." S.D. H.B. 1184,70th Leg. (1995). After being passed by the
Senate, the bill was vetoed by the Governor of South Dakota. A similar bill has been adopted
by the Utah legislature and signed into law. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1995). Utah law
already prohibited marriages of same-sex couples. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (1995). House
Bill 366 amended Utah's marriage validation statute, section 3-1-4, to read:
A marriage solemnized in any other country, state, or territory, if valid where solem-
nized is valid here unless it is a marriage that: (1) would be prohibited or declared void
in this state, under Subsection 30-1-2(1), (3), (5); or (2) would violate Section 30-1-1
because the parties are related to each within and including three degrees of
consanguinity.
UTA- CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1995). Thus, although its validation statute would have otherwise
recognized out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples, this amendment indicates that those mar-
riages are unlikely to receive the validation that most other marriages receive. Additionally,
staunch conservatives are currently attempting to rush through anti-marriage bills in several
other state legislatures which would deny recognition of same-sex marriages which occur in
other states.
22. Creating a marriage can qualify as a "public act" because it occurs under a state's statu-
tory scheme, is performed by an official designated by the state and is an act or "res" created by
the state. The marriage certificate is the "record" of that "act," establishing that the parties are
married and have met the state's qualifications to marry. (Other public records, of presumably
lesser importance, such as birth certificates and automobile titles, have been accorded full faith
and credit.) Celebrating a marriage could also be seen as a "judicial proceeding" in those states
where judges, clerks or justices of the peace officiate. Evan Wolfson & Gregory v. S. McCurdy,
'Let No One Set Asunder': Full Faith and Credit for the Validly Contracted Marriages of Same-
Sex and Different-Sex Couples 15-16 (Sept. 10, 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies).
23. For example:
[The Full Faith and Credit Clause] altered the status of the several states as independ-
ent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the
laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral
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Clause.2 4 Numerous state and federal courts have recognized out-of-
state marriages, using the full faith and credit analysis, even when
those marriages would not have been recognized under the forum
state's laws.5 Winning recognition for marriages which are validly
contracted by same-sex couples through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause will provide the strongest foundation for legal acceptance of
marriages of same-sex couples.
The choice of law doctrine also fails to provide any definite
answers to whether a state will recognize the marriage of a lesbian or
gay couple. Many states, like Colorado, have marriage validation stat-
utes adopted from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which rec-
ognize out-of-state marriages:
All marriages contracted within this state prior to January 1, 1974,
or outside this state that were valid at the time of the contract or
subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were
contracted or by the domicile of the parties are valid in this state. 6
States that have adopted this or similar language should not be
allowed to use public policy reasons to exclude marriages of same-sex
couples from validation under the statute.2 7 Thus, in these states one
part of a single nation, in which rights judicially esiablished in any part are given
nationwide application.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943), partially overruled on other grounds
by Thomas v. Washington Gas Light, 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
24. This may be a result of the country's history of racism and aversion to interracial mar-
riage. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7 (1945) (explaining that the Clause was not used in marriage cases and
other contexts because "the slavery question and [Jim Crow laws] had begun to distort men's
view of government and of law. Talk of 'state sovereignty' became involved in the issue.").
25. Wolfson & McCurdy, supra note 22, at 13; see, eg., Pennsylvania ex rel. Alexander v.
Alexander, 289 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1971) (Jones, J., concurring) (suggesting that in the majority deci-
sion, the court neglected to explicitly give full faith and credit to Georgia marriage certificate);
Orsbum v. Graves, 210 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1948) (holding that Arkansas must give full faith and
credit to validly contracted Texas common-law marriage); Pdrish v. Minvielle, 217 So.2d 684, 688
(La. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that although Louisiana does not recognize or permit common-law
marriages, it must give effect to them when validly contracted in Texas); see also, e.g., Guidry v.
Mezeal, 487 So.2d 780, 781 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Succession of Rodgers, 499 So.2d 429, 495 (La.
Ct. App. 1986). Although New York does not recognize common4aw marriages, it gives full
faith and credit to marriages that are valid under the laws of other states. See Thomas v. Sulli-
van, 922 F.2d 132,134 (2d Cir. 1990); Ram v. Ramharack, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
26. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 14-2-112 (1994). This language is virtually identical to that
found in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 210, 9 U.L.A. 176 (1987).
27. The comments to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act indicate that § 210 "expressly
fails to incorporate the 'strong public policy' exception of the Restatement [Second] and hence
may change the law in some jurisdictions. This section will preclude invalidation of many mar-
riages which would have been invalidated in the past" 9 U.L.A. 176 cmt. (1987) (emphasis
added).
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would expect that marriages in Hawaii of same-sex couples should be
validated unless public policy exceptions are used to refuse
recognition.28
Additionally, many states, like Vermont, have marriage evasion
acts which prohibit couples from avoiding restrictive marriage laws by
marrying in another state:
If a person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state
is prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state
and such person goes into another state or country and there con-
tracts a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this
state, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this
state.2 9
Whether an evasion statute applies depends on whether marriage of a
same-sex couple is "prohibited and declared void" by the domicile
state. At this time, only six states explicitly prohibit marriage of same-
sex couples.3 ° States which do not prohibit these marriages should not
be able to use their marriage evasion statutes to nullify them.
Although the question 'of whether to recognize the marriage of a
same-sex couple may be determined under a state's validation or eva-
sion statutes, it is likely that courts will consider the forum state's
choice of law principles to decide whether to recognize such an out-of-
state marriage. These theories are presently used by courts when they
are faced with conflicting laws or a controversy that involves more
than one state's laws.31 Thus, the court would use the state's choice of
law theory, as applied in other areas such as contracts or torts, to
determine whether or not to recognize the Hawaii marriage due to the
domiciliary state's refusal to permit marriage of same-sex couples.
28. But see supra note 21, for a discussion of how the Utah Legislature amended its valida-
tion statute to not apply to marriages of same-sex couples, in response to the Baehr case.
29. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5 (1993) (emphasis added). This language is adopted from the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 210, 9 U.L.A. 176.
30. Those states are Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Texas, Utah and Virginia. See Cox,
supra note 12, at 1033 n.216. Thus, Utah and Virginia may attempt to use their marriage evasion
statutes to nullify out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples. Six others have ambiguous lan-
guage regarding marriages of same-sex couples. Those states are Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas,
Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio and Wyoming. Id. at 1070 n.217. Of these six, only Kansas and Min-
nesota have marriage evasion statutes. Because the language is ambiguous, marriage of same-
sex couples is not expressly prohibited, so same-sex couples leaving the states to marry in Hawaii
may not violate those states' marriage evasion statutes.
31. For a more detailed discussion of choice of law theories and how these theories would
likely be used when addressing marriages of same-sex couples, see Cox, supra note 12, at 1083-
99.
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But what result? Choice of law commentators consider marriage
to be a settled subject,3 2 but none have anticipated what will happen
when a state is faced with conflicts regarding marriages of same-sex
couples. The overwhelming tendency of courts to validate out-of-state
marriages33 will be countered by the homophobia existing in the judi-
ciary today.34 If courts use choice of law theory to validate or reject
the marriage, those cases will occur on a state-by-state basis and could
continue for years.
Furthermore, same-sex couples will be subjected to the "marriage
visa" which they will have to have "stamped" as they move from state
to state. They will never know whether a state where they choose to
reside will recognize their marriage and provide them with the same
benefits which opposite-sex couples assume follow them as they move
from state to state.
A decision by the U.S. Supreme Court determining that these
marriages are entitled to full faith and credit would be the quickest
way to resolve the issue and would prevent the "hideous" problem
that results when one's marital status varies from state to state.35
Because of these complex "second generation" questions about
recognition of validly contracted marriages of same-sex couples, the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, members of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Section on Individual Rights and Responsibili-
ties, and several law professors and students are researching these
questions. I am helping write a manual which will compile the infor-
mation from this research. This manual will provide guidance on a
state-by-state basis to attorneys who will bring marriage recognition
cases once Hawaii or some other state becomes the first to allow mar-
riage of same-sex couples.36 This battle will determine whether I will
32. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ET. AL., American Conflicts Law §§ 219-221, at 603 (4th ed.
1986); WILLIAM M. RiCHmAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICr OF LAWS
§ 116, at 362 (2d ed. 1993); EUGENE F. ScOLES & PETER HAY, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 13.5, at 436
(2d ed. 1992).
33. See LEFLAR, supra note 32, § 220, at 603; RicwmAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, § 116,
at 362; Sco.rs & HAY, supra note 32, § 13.5, at 436.
34. See Rhonda R: Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HAsTnos L.. 799 (1979).
35. Ricw.AN & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, § 116, at 362.
36. For an interesting article discussing the economic benefits that will accrue to the first
state to solemnize marriages of same-sex couples, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Fed.
eralism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 745
(1995). Brown estimates that this "first-mover" state could receive over four billion dollars in
tourism revenue from same-sex couples traveling to that state to marry. Id. at 747.
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have a legal basis for looking through the "wife" section for Valen-
tine's Day cards in the future.
III. COMING OUT VIA THE MEDIA
In late November, I received a call from Bill Manson of the
Reader, a well-read local newspaper which provides alternative news
coverage and reviews of theater, dance, music and restaurants in San
Diego. He wanted to interview me for a feature story about lesbian
co-parents. He got my name by "surfing" the Internet and had run
across news stories in which I was quoted. As a volunteer attorney for
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, I wrote an amicus curiae brief
in the case of Holtzmann v. Knott,3 7 which was pending at that time
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Oral arguments were held in
November 1994 and the Wisconsin newspapers contacted me then to
discuss the case.
Manson's article, Court Date No Holiday for Feuding Lesbian
Mothers, appeared in the December 22, 1994 edition of the Reader.
He discussed the case and me, who he described as "an avowed les-
bian" whose partner has "raised a daughter who is happily heterosex-
ual."'38 I have always wondered why all lesbians and gay men who are
willing to be out are described as "avowed." It sounds so strident.
Looking up the term in Webster's Dictionary, I discovered that it
means "to declare openly, bluntly, and without shame." 9 I do not
think I was all that blunt in answering his question whether I am a
lesbian; but I did declare my lesbianism openly and without shame, at
least without any more shame than any one would feel having grown
up in our heterosexist society.
Acknowledging one's lesbianism in a paper that is most heavily
read by people the age of my students has allowed me to understand,
on a whole new level, what it means to be out. While I have never
hidden my lesbianism, (except while living next door to my girlfriend
37. In re H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
38. Bill Manson, Court Date No Holiday for Feuding Lesbian Mothers, READER, Dec. 22,
1994, at 10. I am unsure why it is relevant that my partner's daughter, for whom she is a co-
parent, is heterosexual. He asked me and I told him that she is heterosexual. I assume it is
related to the fear that if lesbians and gay men raise children, they will all turn out to be lesbian
or gay themselves, a seemingly shocking result. That idea, while not shocking to me, is absurd;
lesbians and gay men are homosexual, despite most having heterosexual parents. It would seem
just as likely that children of lesbian or gay parents would similarly be as likely to be
heterosexual.
39. WEBsE'S NmIrr NEw CoLLEGiATE DICTIONARY 120 (Meriam-Webster 1987).
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in college who was a resident assistant in a women's dormitory), I did
not realize what it meant to be "avowed" in the popular press. When
meeting members of the incoming January class at CWSL at a school
sponsored reception, several students to whom I would soon teach
Civil Procedure told me they had read the article. That announce-
ment left me struggling for follow-up conversation with them. Should
I discuss the Wisconsin case, thereby keeping our conversation on a
distant, legal foundation, or should I discuss my "avowed" status,
wondering if they were raising the article as a way of "signaling" to me
that they too were either lesbian or gay?
I felt exposed, meeting people who knew intimate details of my
life, without having at least similar knowledge about them. I came to
realize that being an "avowed lesbian" in a heterosexist society made
their information about my sexual orientation much more "relevant"
than my assumption that ninety percent of them were likely to be het-
erosexual. Knowing they are straight means little; knowing I am les-
bian is highly important. So, too, it was important to the Reader's
reporter and editors that my partner's daughter is heterosexual,
despite being raised by two lesbian mothers. One's location on the
sexual orientation continuum is only important to a society that
attaches great meaning to that location.
The case that gave me "avowed" status is one among countless
others which establish that one's location on the sexual orientation
continuum is also important to our legal system. Ms. Holtzmann and
Ms. Knott were in a long-term committed relationship. They decided
they wanted to raise a child together and Ms. Knott was artificially
inseminated. After five years of raising their child, the relationship
between the two women disintegrated. At that point, the legal system
gave Ms. Knott the right to prevent Ms. Holtzmann from having any
contact with their son. Ms. Holtzmann sued to gain either custody or
visitation of the child. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was to decide
whether she would be allowed to see her son anytime before his eight-
eenth birthday.
Unfortunately, this is not the first time the appellate courts have
wrestled with this complex issue of who is a "parent" for custody or
visitation purposes. After numerous years of rejecting the idea,
countless courts have ruled that a stepparent whose marriage with the
biological parent dissolves is entitled to petition for visitation with the
children who were part of their "blended" family. Using doctrines
such as equitable parenthood, equitable estoppel, in loco parentis and
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de facto parenthood, courts have recognized the parental relationship
between a stepparent and the spouse's biological children.4 °
But, until Holtzman, courts had consistently refused to apply
these same doctrines to protect the parental relationship between a
co-parent in a lesbian or gay relationship and the partner's biological
children.4' The only difference between a stepparent and a lesbian or
gay co-parent is that stepparent was married to the children's parent,
while a co-parent who was denied the right to marry was not. This
difference, of the nonbiological parent's location on the sexual orien-
tation continuum, has been enough to shatter the relationship
between this co-parent and the children.
Fortunately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its earlier
decision in In re Interest of Z.JH.,42 and held that Ms. Holtzmann
should be given the opportunity to prove that she had a "parent-like
relationship" with her son and that "a significant triggering event" jus-
tified state intervention in the child's relationship with Ms. Knott, his
biological mother.43 While the court refused to recognize that
"parent-like relationship" as sufficient to support a claim for
40. See Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Family - Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the
Judicial System Has Refused to Protect Nonlegal Parents in Alternative Families, 8 J. LAw &
Porn-cs 5, 19-22 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding
that a partner is not a parent under the Parentage Act); In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a woman with a live-in relationship with a child's mother
was not a "parent" within meaning of statute which allowed "either parent" to apply for writ of
habeas corpus); In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), overruled by In re H.S.H-
K., 533 N.W. 2d 419 (ruling that a co-parenting contract between the plaintiff and adoptive par-
ent was not enforceable insofar as it concerned physical placement of the child).
42. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
43. The court held that to demonstrate the existence of a parent-like relationship with the
child, Ms. Holtzmann must prove:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the
petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's
care, education and development, including contributing towards the child's support,
without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a
parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded,
dependent relationship parental in nature.
In re H.S.H-K. at 421. In order to establish a significant triggering event justifying state inter-
vention in the child's relationship with its biological or adoptive parent, the petitioner must
prove "that this parent has interfered substantially with the petitioner's parent-like relationship
with the child, and that the petitioner sought court ordered visitation within a reasonable time
after the parent's interference." Id. at 436. Once the petitioner establishes both elements, the
trial court has the discretion to consider whether visitation with the petitioner is in the best
interest of the child. Id.
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custody," the Wisconsin Supreme Court rendered a ground breaking
decision that may lead the way for other courts to recognize the
parental relationship between lesbian and gay co-parents and their
children. No longer will children be forced to lose one of their parents
simply because the legal system cannot accept that parent's location
on the sexual orientation continuum.
IV. CAN BEING OUT CAUSE HARM?
I took my new truck into the dealership in early February to get
its first oil change and to have a few minor adjustments made. I had
-recently met an assistant service manager there who is a lesbian,
although she is not "out" at work. I took my truck to her and asked
her to supervise the work on it. While driving there, I wondered
whether asking her "service crew" to do the work would in any way
jeopardize her closeted status on the job, or her job, since it would be
obvious we were friends when I dropped the truck off. I was con-
cerned because when I first got the truck, I put a rainbow flag on the
bumper and a black triangle on the rear window.4 5
I was worried that having a friend who had such "blatant" sym-
bols of lesbianism on her truck might "out" her at work. I would have
hated to put her at risk, knowing that she chooses not to be out at
work because she feels it is unnecessary information for the men with
whom she works to have about her. While we disagree on whether it
is worthwhile to be out at work, I did not want her to be harmed by
my decision to be out. Although many in the lesbian and gay commu-
nity believe it is valuable to out others, especially those who are in
positions of power and use that power to harm us,' I do not choose to
out anyone who has not made that choice herself or himself. I
worried all the way to the dealership that morning whether my truck
was too blatant to be serviced "safely."
44. The court held that "[a] person who is not a biological or adoptive parent may not bring
an action to obtain custody of a minor unless the biological or adoptive parent is 'unfit or unable
to care for the child' or there are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a nonparent." Id.
at 423. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that Holtzmann had not shown a triable issue
regarding Knott's fitness or ability to care for the child and that she had not shown the existence
of compelling circumstances that would warrant transferring custody from Knott to Holtzmann,
Id. at 424.
45. The rainbow flag, based on Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, is an accepted symbol of
the lesbian and gay civil rights movement. The black triangle was the symbol lesbians were
forced to wear in Nazi Germany's concentration camps.
46. See MICHELANoELO SooNORILE, QUEER IN AMERICA: SEX, THE MEDIA, & THE
CLOSETS OF POWER 77 (1993).
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The following weekend, my partner and I had dinner with this
woman and two other friends. We also watched a videotape of Serv-
ing in Silence, the TV-movie about Margarethe Cammemeyer. Colo-
nel Cammemeyer was discharged from her position as Chief Nurse of
the State of Washington National Guard when she honestly answered
the question of whether she was a lesbian during an investigation for a
heightened security clearance.47 As the movie depicted, Cam-
memeyer made it clear that she was not going to lie about her sexual
orientation and when asked whether she was a lesbian, she simply
answered yes. Despite her excellent career, including numerous med-
als and commendations, the Army did not hesitate to discharge her.
The highest ranking officer ever discharged for lesbianism,48 Cam-
memeyer was ordered reinstated into the National Guard following a
federal district court trial.4 9 The case is currently on appeal at the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Watching the movie with my friend made me realize that all of us
encounter these issues throughout our daily lives. Both Colonel Cam-
memeyer and my friend are lesbians; both have legitimate concerns
about whether their jobs will be put at risk simply by announcing to
their colleagues that they are lesbian, and each of them has chosen the
option that seems most appropriate to her for handling this situation.
Both of them are brave women, trying to live in a world which cannot
forgive them for their sexual orientation. Each of them has chosen a
path that has its own difficulties, balancing the personal and profes-
sional reasons for coming out or remaining silent. Neither of them is
wrong.
V. CONCLUSION
Members of the Symposium panel discussed whether they agreed
with my view that "neither is wrong." One stated that it is incumbent
on all gay men and lesbians to come out in order to make any mean-
ingful progress toward ending the discrimination and hostility that
heterosexual society feels comfortable heaping on us. She is right.
Only by coming out to those closest to us, to our daily acquaintances
and to anonymous strangers, will we finally convince this society that
one's location on the sexual orientation continuum is not an accepta-
ble basis for causing harm to people.
47. See Cammemeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 912-13 (W.D. Wa. 1994).
48. Id at 913 n.6.
49. lId at 929.
1995]
104 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 5:89
Another panelist concluded that, while she agreed with this senti-
ment, she knew for herself that she had not been able to come out
until she was ready. Despite being prodded by friends and despite
being convinced logically by their arguments, she still felt the fear that
we all know underlies our decision to remain in the closet. Once she
realized that being out could cause her little more pain than what she
already felt by hiding herself from the people around her, she came
out and now is another one of us "professional lesbians."' 50 Once she
was ready, coming out was easy and even felt like walking into a free-
dom that she had not expected would be so marvelous. But after tell-
ing this story, she remained convinced that none of us can or should
be pushed to take the step to be out until we are ready and can feel
the sunshine and warmth that will be ours once we exit the closet for
good.5 '
She too is right. While I sometimes grow impatient with my
friends' timetables for coming out, I try to be gentle in my expecta-
tions of them. I realize, as this discussion illustrates, how difficult it is
to be out; how many times each of us has to come out, over and over,
in vastly different situations; and how tiring it becomes to fight the
fear and intolerance that we so often feel. Only through coming out
can we be free, and until our lesbianism is accepted by society, we will
continue to fight these practical battles, both personally and
professionally.
Having fought each of these battles myself, I am relieved that I
did not have to fight yet another one while trying to find a law journal
to publish this paper. Normally, I would wonder whether any journal
would publish an article on the practical battles lesbians face. But I
do not have to fight that battle, thanks to the students from the
Review of'Law and Women's Studies at the University of Southern
California Law Center. By holding the first ever symposium on Lesbi-
ans in the Law, they are fighting that battle for us and probably having
their own battles with "guilt by association" for dedicating a volume
of their journal to lesbian issues. We are all thankful to them for their
courage to sponsor this Symposium and wish them luck in fighting
these battles alongside us.
50. "Professional lesbians" are those of us who spend a portion of our work time being out
and addressing gay and lesbian rights issues at work or in our society.
51. B. Kay Schafer, Hate Crimes and Other Practical Battles, 5 S. CAL. REV. & WOMEN'S
STuD. 131 (1995).
